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Abstract 
Over the last few decades, services acquisition has continued to increase in scope and 
dollars obligated. Contracting for services has grown in relation to systems contracting over 
the last couple of decades and is the fastest growing procurement sector for the DoD. This 
growth in dollars obligated has attracted increased political attention and scrutiny on an 
already problematic defense contracting process. The DoD has responded to these problems 
by improving services acquisition in several different ways, but even with these 
improvements, services acquisition still has problems in the areas of procurement planning, 
source selection, and contract administration. This research continues our ongoing 
investigation in DoD services acquisition by exploring the determinants of contract success. 
We use the DoD Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) as a 
proxy for contract success and determine if there are any relationships between contract 
variables (type of service, contract dollar value, level of competition, contract type) and 
contract success based on CPARS ratings (quality of product/service, schedule, cost control, 
business relations, management of key personnel, and utilization of small business). Our 
research findings revealed that contract dollar value and level of competition affected the 
success of a service contract. The findings also revealed that the failure rate in CPARS was 
lower than expected. Finally, we saw that as the percentage of 1102 filled billets increased, 
the contract failure rate decreased. We also observed that as workload dollars per filled billet 
increased, contractor performance ratings also increased, and thus contract failure ratings 
decreased. From these findings, we present a discussion of the results and the managerial 
implications. 
Introduction 
The service sector represents the largest and the fastest-growing segment of the 
economies of the United States and other developed countries. This growth of services in 
the overall economy is also mirrored by the growth of services acquisition in the Department 
of Defense (DoD). For example, DoD obligations on contracts have more than doubled 
between fiscal years 2001 and 2008 to over $387 billion, with over $200 billion spent just for 
services in 2008 (GAO, 2009a). However, during this time period, the acquisition workforce 
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declined from about 500,000 to about 200,000 personnel by 2006 (Gansler, 2011, p. 237). 
The downsizing of the defense acquisition workforce has reduced the qualified contracting 
and acquisition workforce necessary to manage the increased service contract workload 
(GAO, 2002b, 2009b). 
According to the GAO, the poor management of service contracts has undermined 
the government’s ability to obtain a good value for the money spent and has contributed to 
the GAO’s decision to designate management of services contracts as a high-risk area for 
the DoD (GAO, 2013). In fact, as stressed in a recent memorandum for acquisition 
professionals from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, improving the efficiency of acquisition of products and services is of utmost 
importance to the DoD (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2010a). More specifically, in a later memorandum, the USD(AT&L) 
focused on “improving tradecraft in services acquisition” by strengthening and improving the 
services contracting process (USD[AT&L], 2010b, p. 5).  
As the DoD’s services acquisition continues to increase, the agency must give 
greater attention to proper acquisition planning, adequate requirements definition, sufficient 
price evaluation, and proper contractor oversight (GAO, 2002b). In some ways, the issues 
affecting services acquisition are similar to those affecting the acquisition of physical 
supplies and weapon systems. However, the unique characteristics of services and the 
increasing importance of services acquisition offer a significant opportunity for conducting 
research in the management of services acquisition in the DoD. 
Research Methodology 
The objective of this research is to identify variables in the services contracting 
process that drive the success of services acquisition. Based on the analysis of our data, we 
generalize our research findings and provide recommendations for improving the Army’s as 
well as the DoD’s services acquisition management. Our research approach includes 
analyzing contractor past performance data obtained from the DoD Past Performance 
Information Retrieval System Report Cards (PPIRS-RC) database. The PPIRS-RC database 
consists of contractor performance assessment reports contained in the DoD Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). We accessed the PPIRS-RC 
database to collect contractor performance ratings on completed services contracts 
provided by CPARS to determine whether the contracts are successful or not successful. 
Statistical analysis is used to draw conclusions on whether certain contracting variables 
affect the success of the contract. The specific contract variables analyzed are type of 
service, contract dollar value, level of competition, and contract type. The following are the 
specific questions answered in this research: 
1. Do the types of services being acquired affect the success of a service 
contract? 
2. Do the contractual amounts affect the success of a service contract? 
3. Does the level of competition used affect the success of a service contract? 
4. Does the contract type affect the success of a services contract? 
Literature Review 
We have addressed the need for research in this increasingly important area of 
services acquisition by undertaking six sponsored research projects over the past six years. 
The first two research projects (Apte, Ferrer, Lewis, & Rendon, 2006; Apte & Rendon, 2007) 
were exploratory in nature, aimed at understanding the types of services being acquired, the 
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associated rates of growth in services acquisition, and the major challenges and 
opportunities present in the service supply chain.  
The next two research projects were survey-based empirical studies aimed at 
developing a high-level understanding of how services acquisition is currently being 
managed at a wide range of Army, Navy, and Air Force installations (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 
2008, 2009). The analysis of survey data indicated that the current state of services 
acquisition management suffers from several deficiencies, including deficit billet and 
manning levels (which are further aggravated by insufficient training and the inexperience of 
acquisition personnel) and the lack of strong project-team and life-cycle approaches. Our 
research (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2010) also analyzed and compared the results of the 
primary data collected in two previous empirical studies involving Army, Navy, and Air Force 
contracting organizations so as to develop a more thorough and comprehensive 
understanding of how services acquisition is being managed within individual military 
departments.  
As a result of these research projects dealing with the service supply chain in the 
DoD, we developed a comprehensive, high-level understanding of services acquisition in the 
DoD, identified several specific deficiencies, and proposed a number of concrete 
recommendations for performance improvement. 
Based on the foundation of the previously mentioned management theories, 
conclusions of the GAO and DoDIG reports (Seifert & Ermoshkin, 2010), and findings of our 
own sponsored research projects on the topic, we believe that the success of services 
acquisition contracts is significantly influenced by four broadly defined factors: (1) the type 
and quantity of services being outsourced and the associated amount of acquisition-related 
workload; (2) the characteristics of contracts being awarded; (3) the capacity available to 
carry out the contracting, project management, and surveillance work; and (4) various 
management practices such as use of project team or life-cycle approaches, and so forth.  
The contract characteristics are affected by the type of service being acquired, while 
the management practices being used are influenced by the services being acquired, the 
contract characteristics, and, more important, the capacity available to perform the 
acquisition work. The success of services contracts, in turn, is affected by the previously 
mentioned four drivers. This is the fundamental question that motivates our in-depth 
research: What drives the success of services contracts? This fundamental question is, of 
course, critically important, and yet it is also not one that can be answered easily or quickly. 
We believe that, generally, in the case of questions related to complex systems, it is 
preferable to break down the overall system in smaller parts, gain an understanding of the 
functioning of each part, and then put all the pieces together to better understand the overall 
system and answer the fundamental question.  
Based on our conceptual model, we sought to understand how the success of 
services contracts is being defined and measured by different stakeholders. On the 
aggregate level, our research indicated that, when defining a successful service contract, 
stakeholders considered outcomes (in the order of performance, cost, and schedule) slightly 
more important than processes. Stakeholders also ranked outcome-related factors as most 
important. Additionally, on the aggregate, our research indicated that, when measuring a 
successful service contract, stakeholders considered outcomes (in the order of cost, 
schedule, and performance) more important than processes. Stakeholders also ranked 
outcome-related factors as most important. On the stakeholder level, our research indicated 
that, when defining a successful service contract, PMs, CORs, and COs considered 
outcomes (in the order of performance, cost, and schedule) slightly more important than 
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processes. PMs, CORs, and COs also ranked outcome-related factors as most important. 
On the stakeholder level, our research indicated that, when measuring a successful service 
contract, PMs, CORs, and COs considered outcomes (in the order of performance, 
schedule, and cost) more important than processes. PMs, CORs, and COs also ranked 
outcome-related factors as most important (Apte & Rendon, 2013).  
Building on these research findings concerning how stakeholders define and 
measure the success of services contracts, we now explore the question of what variables 
in the services contracting process drive the success of services acquisition. As previously 
discussed, our research on defining and measuring services contracting success found that, 
on the aggregate, stakeholders considered outcomes slightly more important than 
processes for both defining and measuring success. Thus, we adopt contract outcomes, 
specifically the outcomes as reflected in the contractor performance assessment report, as a 
proxy for contract success. The next section provides a brief background on contractor 
performance information. 
Contractor Performance Information 
Contractor performance information is information regarding a contractor’s 
performance under previously awarded contracts. Federal procurement policy requires that 
agencies collect contractor performance information for contracts over $100,000 and make 
that information available for use in future contract award decisions (Nash, Schooner, 
O’Brien-Debakey, & Edwards, 2007). The collection of contractor performance information 
occurs during the contract closeout phase using the DoD Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS; Rendon & Snider, 2008). The CPARS assessment 
data reflect the contractor’s performance in specific areas including quality, schedule, cost 
control, business relations, management of key personnel, and utilization of small business. 
Additionally, the CPARS assessment rates the contractor in these areas using the rating 
scales Exceptional, Very Good, Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory. It should be 
noted that the contractor is allowed to review the CPAR assessment and provide comments 
back to the government assessing official prior to the government’s finalizing the CPAR 
report.  
The contractor performance information reported in CPARS and accessible through 
PPIRS provides outcome-based data that can be used to identify successful contracts. The 
successful contracts determined by using contractor performance information are used in 
our research methodology to identify the contract variables that lead to contract success. 
The research methodology for this project is discussed next. 
Research Design 
With the assistance of our MBA thesis students (Hart et al., 2013), we searched the 
PPIRS database to identify Army Mission Installation Contracting Command (MICC) 
services (non-systems) contracts for the period 1996–2013. This search yielded 14,395 
contracts in total. The data were then refined to include only those contracts associated with 
the following product/service codes: 
 R: Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services 
 J: Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment Services 
 S: Utilities and Housekeeping Services 
 D: Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications Services 
This data refinement yielded 5,621 contracts. Our database was further refined by 
focusing on five Army MICC contracting organizations. These organizations were selected 
because they are MICC field directorate offices (FDOs) of this specific Army contracting 
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command. This data refinement resulted in 715 service contracts that were used in 
conducting our analysis, as seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. Database Breakdown 
(Hart et al., 2013) 
Total Contracts 
Total Army MICC Non-System Contracts 14,395 
Less: Non–R, J, S, D Service Contracts 8,774 
Total R, J, S, D Service Contracts 5,621 
Less: R, J, S, D Service Contracts at other 
MICC  4,906 
R, J, S, D Service Contracts at MICC FDO 
Eustis, Knox, Hood, Bragg, Sam Houston 715 
          Fort Eustis 238
          Fort Knox 119
          Fort Hood 114
          Fort Bragg 55
          Fort Sam Houston 189
For each contract, data were collected on specific contract variables (type of service, 
contract dollar value, level of competition, contract type) and specific contractor assessment 
ratings (quality of product/service, schedule, cost control, business relations, management 
of key personnel, and utilization of small business). It should be noted that the data collected 
from the PPIRS database were sanitized by removing identifiable data such as contract 
number, contractor name, DUNS number, and place of performance. In addition to the 
contractor performance information accessed from the PPIRS-RC database, we also 
collected MICC region organization demographic data (annual workload in dollars, annual 
workload in actions, number of 1102 billets authorized, and percentage of 1102 billets filled 
(Hart et al., 2013), These data were also analyzed to determine whether these 
organizational demographics were related to contract success. 
Determining a contract to be successful or unsuccessful was made based on 
whether the contractor received a marginal or unsatisfactory rating in any of the CPAR 
assessment areas (quality of product/service, schedule, cost control, business relations, 
management of key personnel, or utilization of small business). The contractor’s receiving a 
marginal or unsatisfactory rating in any one of these assessment areas results in the 
determination of the contract as unsuccessful.  
Based on the analysis of the data pertaining to contract variables and contractor 
assessment ratings, we answered our four primary research questions. Figure 1 illustrates 
our research methodology. The column on the right contains the six CPARS assessment 
areas. These areas are used to determine whether each contract is successful or 
unsuccessful based on the CPAR ratings (marginal or unsatisfactory). The successful 
contracts are analyzed using the four contract variables shown on the left column. The 
purpose is to determine whether there is a relationship between contract variables and 
contract success. 
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 Research Methodology 
(Hart et al., 2013) 
Findings and Analysis 
In this section, we present an analysis of our findings. As mentioned previously, the 
primary purpose of this research is to determine if there is a relationship between contract 
variables (type of service, contract dollar value, level of competition, contract type) and 
contract success (based on contractor assessment rating of quality, schedule, cost control, 
business relations, management of key personnel, and utilization of small business). With 
the assistance of our MBA thesis students (Hart et al., 2013), we analyzed the data and 
provide our findings at the aggregate level, as well as the contract variable level.  
Aggregate Findings 
The database consisted of 715 contracts accessed from the PPIRS database. Of 
these contracts, 22 were determined to be unsuccessful based on the CPAR assessment 
area ratings, as described in the previous section. This resulted in a total contract failure 
rate of 3.08%. These results are seen clearly in Table 2. 
Table 2. Total Contract Information 
(Hart et al., 2013) 
  Failures Success Total Failure Rate 
Contracts 22 693 715 3.08% 
Additionally, each assessment area was given a score associated with its rating 
(Exceptional, 5; Very Good, 4; Satisfactory, 3; Marginal, 2; Unsatisfactory, 1). These 
assessment area ratings were then averaged to examine what assessment areas were 
rated higher throughout the population (see Table 3). As reflected in Table 3, business 
relations had the highest average rate of failure among the other assessment areas.  
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Table 3. Average Success and Failure Rates of PPIRS Areas of Contract Evaluation 
(Hart et al., 2013) 
  
Successes 
Average Ratings  
Failures Average 
Ratings  
Quality 4.19 2.5 
Schedule 4.19 2.5 
Cost Control 4.1 2.31 
Business Relations 4.17 3 
Management of Key Personnel 4.18 2.68 
Utilization of Small Business 4.07 2.5 
The next section briefly summarizes our research findings for each contract variable. 
For further discussion of our research findings, please reference out technical report NPS-
CM-14-001. 
Type of Service: Finding 1—The S type services (Utilities and Housekeeping) had the 
highest failure rate of all the product service codes analyzed.  
In answering the first research question, “Do the types of services being acquired 
affect the success of a service contract?,” we analyzed the failure rates of each service type. 
The database contained 331 R type (Professional, Administrative, and Management 
Support) services, 58 J type (Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment) services, 
292 S type (Utilities and Housekeeping) services and 34 D type (Automatic Data Processing 
and Telecommunications) services.  
The S type services had 11 contract failures resulting in a 3.77% failure rate. Two 
reasons tied for the most common reasons for S type service failures. These reasons were 
six business relation failures and six failures due to management of key personnel. R type 
services had nine labeled failing contracts out of 331, giving R type services a failure rate of 
2.72% which was the second lowest. The most common reason for the failure was quality. J 
type services consisted of 58 contracts with two labeled failures. This gave the J type 
contracts a failure rate of 3.45%. Scheduling was listed as a reason for both labeled failures 
of the J type services. There were only 34 of D service code contract types with zero 
failures. 
Although it was found that the type of service was not statistically significant in terms 
of effecting contract success, it was observed that utilities and housekeeping service 
contracts failed six times for business relations and six times for management of key 
personnel out of the 11 reported failures. Mitigating this contract risk should focus on the 
source selection phase, specifically the proposal evaluation activity. During this phase the 
contracting agency can emphasize its assessment of the offeror’s ability to coordinate its 
business activities, such as its attitude towards customers, customer satisfaction, and 
cooperation. Additionally, during source selection, the contracting agency should increase 
its emphasis on evaluating the offeror’s management proposal, and assessing the offeror’s 
ability to maintain qualified individuals in key positions as required in the solicitation.  
Contract Dollar Value: Finding 2—Contracts with a dollar value from $50 million to $1 
billion had the highest failure rate of all the contract categories. 
In answering the second research question, “Do the contractual amounts affect the 
success of a service contract?,” we grouped the contracts into the following categories: $0 
to $1 million, greater than $1 million to $10 million, greater than $10 million to $50 million, 
greater than $50 million to $1 billion, and greater than $1 billion.  
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The $50 million to $1 billion category consisted of 92 contracts with eight labeled 
failures, giving it a failure rate of 8.7%. This group’s most common reason for failing was 
cost control, which was listed for six failed contracts. This failure rate is much higher than 
the total contract average failure rate of 3.08%.  
In the first group that consisted of contracts that were worth $0 to $1 million, there 
were a total of 35 contracts. In this first group, there was only one labeled a failure. This 
gave this group a 2.86% failure rate. This contract was labeled a failure because of quality. 
The group consisting of contracts greater than $1 to $10 million was the largest of all 
the grouped dollar amounts. It consisted of 466 contracts, and of those, 10 were labeled 
failures. That gave this group a 2.15% failure rate. While this group had the most failures 
numerically, it still was under the average failure rate because of the number of contracts in 
this group. The most common reason for this group to fail was for quality, which was cited 
seven times.  
The contracts in the greater than $10 to $50 million group consisted of 118 contracts. 
There were three labeled failures in this group. This group had a 2.54% failure rate. This 
group was also under the average total contract failure rate of 3.08%. This contract group 
most commonly failed for scheduling issues and management of key personnel. It failed for 
scheduling twice and management of key personnel twice. This means that one of the 
contracts in this group had both issues listed as reasons for failure.  
The group consisting of contracts worth greater than $1 billion was the smallest 
group in our contractual amount grouping. It only consisted of four contracts and did not 
contain any labeled failures.  
Our analysis found that the contract dollar value does have a significant impact on 
service contracting success. Contracts with dollar values in the $50 million–$1 billion range 
had the highest failure rate at 8.7%. The most common reason for this failure was cost 
control. Assuming that the awarded contract was proper (based on an accurate government 
cost estimate), mitigating this contract risk should focus on the source selection phase. 
During the evaluation of the offeror’s cost proposal, the source selection team should 
accurately assess the offeror’s ability to forecast, manage, and control the cost associated 
with conducting the services. Additionally, the source selection team must ensure that all 
source selection evaluators are properly trained on how to accurately evaluate the offeror’s 
cost proposal to ensure the business fully understands the contract requirements.  
Our analysis also found that the group of contracts with values ranging from $1 
million–$10 million had a total of 10 failures, with seven failures listed for quality reasons. 
Although not statistically significant, this reason for failure deserves further discussion. 
Mitigating the contract quality risk should focus on the technical proposal evaluation during 
the source selection phase. The source selection team should be thoroughly knowledgeable 
about the technical and quality requirements of the solicitation. Only with a competent 
source selection team can a sufficient evaluation of the offeror’s technical and quality 
approach be conducted. A thorough evaluation of the offer’s technical proposal will reveal 
whether the offeror has the technical capability to meet the contract quality requirements. 
Level of Competition: Finding 3—Contracts awarded competitively had the highest 
failure rate when compared to the other contracts.  
In answering the third research question, “Does the level of competition affect the 
success of a service contract?,” we grouped the contracts into three categories: competitive, 
non-competitive, and other. The researchers looked at these different categories separately 
and examined the failure rate of each group.  
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Of the 540 competitive contracts, 17 were labeled as failures, which yields a failure 
rate of 3.15%. The reasons that most often resulted in a contract failure were in the areas of 
schedule and cost control, which were each referenced seven times. The next highest 
referenced source of failure was management of key personnel, which was referenced six 
times.  
Non-competitive contracts had the next highest failure rate at 2.91%. There were 172 
non-competitive contracts in the database, of which five were labeled failures. Quality was 
referenced four times while schedule, management of key personnel, and business relations 
were each referenced twice.  
Contracts competed as Other had three contracts in the database with zero labeled 
failures.  
Our research found that competitively awarded contracts had the highest of the 
category’s failure rates at 3.15%. These contracts failed seven times for scheduling reasons 
and seven times for cost control. The implications of these findings point to the proposal 
evaluation aspect of the source selection process. The source selection evaluators must 
fully understand the cost, schedule, and performance requirements of the solicitation in 
order to properly evaluate the offeror’s proposal. The offeror’s proposal will reflect its 
understanding of the contract requirements as well as its capability for meeting those 
requirements. If the government does not do an adequate job of evaluating the offeror’s 
proposal, it increases the risk for contractor schedule delays and cost overruns.  
Contract Type: Finding 4—Contracts structured as a combination contract had the 
highest failure rate when compared to the other five types of available contracts.  
In answering the fourth research question, “Does the contract type affect the success 
of a service contract?,” we grouped the contracts into six categories: Cost Plus Award Fee 
(CPAF), Combination, Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF), Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF), Firm 
Fixed-Price (FFP), and Other. The Other category includes all the contracts that did not fit 
into the previous five categories, such as Labor Hours and Time and Materials.  
There were four combination contracts examined in the database. Of these four 
contracts, two were labeled failures, which yields a failure rate of 50.0%. Schedule and cost 
were both referenced twice in the failed contracts, while quality and management of key 
personnel were each referenced once.  
Cost plus fixed fee contracts had the next highest failure rate at 5.56%. There were 
36 CPFF contracts in the database, of which two were labeled failures. Cost control was 
referenced twice, and schedule was referenced once in the failed contracts.  
Contracts competed as cost plus award fee had 58 contracts in the database, with 
three of them labeled as failures. This yielded a failure rate of 5.17%. Two of these failed 
contracts referenced cost control and business relations, while one referenced the 
management of key personnel.  
Firm fixed-price contracts had 524 contracts in the database, with 14 of them labeled 
as failures. This yielded a failure rate of 2.68%. Seven of these failed contracts referenced 
quality, while six referenced the management of key personnel.  
Other contract types had 89 contracts in the database with one labeled as a failure 
due to quality and schedule, which yielded a failure rate of 1.12%. There were four cost plus 
incentive fee contracts, which had zero labeled failures.  
The type of contract used in these services acquisition was statistically significant in 
relation to contract success. Of three categories of contract types (combination, CPAF, and 
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CPIF), the combination type showed a failure rate of 50% (two failures out of four), CPAF 
showed a failure rate of 5.17%, and CPFF a failure rate of 5.56%. These last two categories 
are double the failure rate of the FFP category which was 2.67%. The leading and recurring 
cause of contract failure for these contracts was cost control. The implication of this finding 
focuses us on the procurement planning phase of services acquisition. The government’s 
effort during procurement planning, specifically the requirements analysis and the market 
research activities, should ensure that the requirement and the market are sufficiently 
analyzed in order to select the appropriate contract type. The more defined the requirement, 
the more appropriate it is to use a fixed-price contract. In the event that a cost-type contract 
is selected, the government should ensure that an accurate cost estimate is developed to be 
used in cost negotiations. Additionally, during the source selection phase, specifically the 
cost proposal evaluation activity, the government should ensure that the offeror’s cost 
proposal accurately reflects a thorough understanding of the service effort and the related 
costs. If the government does not do an adequate job in evaluating the offeror’s proposal, 
the risk increases for contractor schedule delays and cost overruns. If the government does 
not conduct a sufficient evaluation of the offeror’s cost proposal, it may award the contract to 
an offeror who does not have an adequate understanding of the service requirement and 
thus leads to greater possibility of cost overruns. In addition to the contract variables 
previously discussed, we also analyzed other variables to determine whether they had any 
effect on contract success. The other variables include MICC annual workload (by dollar 
value), MICC annual workload (by number of actions), number of 1102 billets, and 
percentage of 1102 billets filled. We also analyzed the data in terms of workload (in dollars) 
per filled billet. The next section discusses the findings related to these variables. 
Significance Testing 
We further analyzed our data to determine whether any of the variables had a 
significant relationship with contract success by specifically looking at the contract failure 
rates. We used the chi-square test (Fisher’s exact test) to test whether the actual failure 
rates are significantly different than from what would be expected if the total contract failure 
rate was applied to each variable. The null hypothesis for this test was that the category 
failure rates within the variables are not significantly different from the total contract failure 
rate (3.08%). We reject the null hypothesis if the p-value for the variable is less than .05. 
The results of the chi-square test are reflected in Table 4. 
Table 4. Chi-Square and Fisher’s Exact p-Value Test Results 
(Hart et al., 2013) 
Contract Variables p-value Significant? 
Type of Service (RJSD) 0.761 No 
Contractual Amounts 0.036 Yes 
Level of Competition 1.00 No 
Contract Type 0.009 Yes 
The chi-square test resulted in only two variables being significantly different when 
the average total contract failure rate is applied to the variable (3.08%). These variables 
were contract dollar value (p = .036) and contract type (p = .009). In the contract dollar value 
variable, the category of $50 million to $1 billion had an expected failure rate of 1 but had an 
actual failure rate of 8. In the contract type variable, the category of Combination Type 
contracts was expected to have a 0.1 failure but actually had 2 failures. Additionally, FFP 
Type contracts were expected to have 16 failures but actually had 14 failures. Finally, Other 
Type contracts were expected to have 3 failures but only had 1 failure.  
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MICC Workload in Dollars: Finding 5—Regional MICC offices that had spent between 
$0 and $500 million in annual workload had the highest failure rate.  
We grouped the contracts into three categories based on the MICC regional office’s 
annual workload (dollars obligated). The categories consisted of total dollars obligated 
between $0 and $500 million, greater than $500 million to $1 billion, and greater than $1 
billion.  
The first category, MICC regions that obligated between $0 and $500 million, 
consisted of 344 contracts and had a failure rate of 4.36%. The primary reason stated for 
failure in this category was schedule.  
The second category, MICC regions that obligated greater than $500 million to $1 
billion, consisted of 256 contracts with a failure rate of 2.34%. Management of key personnel 
was stated as the reason for failures.  
The third category, obligations greater than $1 billion, contained 115 contracts with 
only one of them labeled as a failure, giving it a 0.87% failure rate. The labeled failure listed 
cost control and business relations as the reason for failure.  
MICC Workload in Actions: Finding 6—MICCs that completed 3,501 to 7,000 contract 
actions annually had the highest failure rate when compared to MICCs that completed 
3,500 or fewer contract actions.  
We grouped the contracts into two categories based on the MICC regional office’s 
annual workload (actions completed). The first category ranged from 0 to 3,500 contract 
actions. The second category ranged from 3,501 to 7,000 contract actions.  
The 3,501 to 7,000 contract actions category consisted of 277 contracts. Of these 
277 contracts, nine were labeled as failures, which yielded a failure rate of 3.25%. Quality 
and the management of key personnel were each referenced five times in the failed 
contracts.  
The 0 to 3,500 contract actions category consisted of 413 contracts of which 12 were 
labeled as failures, resulting in a failure rate of 2.91%. Schedule and cost control were each 
referenced five times while quality was referenced four times in the failed contracts. There 
were no data available for the 25 contracts of which one was labeled a failure.  
1102 Billets Authorized: Finding 7—The category with 0 to 50 1102 billets had the 
highest failure rate.  
We grouped the contracts into three categories based on the number of 1102 billets 
authorized for each MICC regional office. The first category consisted of MICC regional 
offices that had 0 to 50 1102 billets, the second category consisted of MICC regional offices 
that had over 50 authorized 1102 billets. (There were 25 contracts that did not have any 
data available).  
MICC regional offices that had 0 to 50 authorized 1102 billets consisted of 147 
contracts with eight failures, giving these MICC offices a failure rate of 5.44%. The common 
reason for these failures was quality. This reason was listed for five of the eight labeled 
failed contracts.  
MICC regional offices that had over 50 authorized 1102 billets consisted of 543 
contracts with 13 failures, giving this group a 2.39% failure rate. The most common reason 
for failure listed for this group was schedule. This reason was listed seven times out of the 
13 labeled failed contracts.  
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The final category did not have data on authorized billets. This group contained 25 
total contracts with one failure, giving this category a 4% failure rate.  
1102 Billets (Percentage Filled): Finding 8—As the percentage of 1102 filled billets 
increased, the contract failure rate decreased.  
We grouped the contracts into six categories based on the percentage of 1102 billets 
filled for each MICC regional office. The categories consisted of MICC regional offices that 
had billets 50–60% filled, 61–70% filled, 71–80% filled, 81–90% filled, and 91–100% filled. 
(There were also contract data that did not contain adequate billet information.)  
The MICC region group of 1102 billets that were 61–70% filled had 81 contracts, with 
a 4.94% failure rate. The most common reasons listed for this group to fail were schedule 
and cost control.  
For the MICC region group of 1102 billets that were 50–60% filled had 22 contracts 
with one labeled failure, which gave this group a 4.55% failure rate. This rate is higher than 
the total contract average of 3.08%. The reason for the failure in this group was quality, 
scheduling, and management of key personnel.  
The next group of 1102 billets that were 71–80% filled consisted of 122 total 
contracts with five contracts labeled as failures, giving this group a 4.1% failure rate. This 
group was higher than the total contract failure rate of 3.08%. The most frequent reasons 
listed for the contract failures were schedule and cost control.  
The group that contained billets filled 81–89% had 233 contracts with five labeled as 
failures, giving this group a 2.15% failure rate. The most common reasons for failure of 
these contracts were quality, schedule, and business relations.  
The data for the final group that had billets 90–100% filled consisted of 99 total 
contracts. It contained one labeled failure, giving this group a failure rate of 1.01%. The 
reason for the failure in this group was management of key personnel. 
Although it was found that the percentage of 1102 billets filled was not statistically 
significant in terms of effecting contract success, it was observed that as the percentage of 
1102 filled billets increased, the contract failure rate decreased. Thus, as the MICCs 
contracting workforce increased, the contract success rate increased. This finding supports 
the previous reports on the importance of having trained 1102 personnel (GAO, 2002b, 
2009a; Gansler, 2011). Having a sufficient contracting workforce enables the government to 
perform due diligence not only in the source selection phase of the contract, but also in the 
contract administration phase as well.  
Workload Per Filled Billet: Finding 9—As workload dollars per filled billet increases, 
contractor performance ratings also increase, and thus contract failure ratings 
decrease.  
In addition to analyzing the data in terms of workload (both dollars and actions) as 
well as billets (both authorized and percentage filled), we also analyzed the data by looking 
at workload (in dollars) per filled billet as it correlated with associated failure rates and 
average CPARS ratings across seven dimensions for which contracts are rated. Our 
purpose here was to determine whether workload (in dollars) per filled billet, as a measure 
of contracting work being performed by an individual, is related to contract failure rate, as 
reflected in performance outcome.  
We determined a coefficient of correlation between each average performance and 
workload per filled billet. A positive correlation indicates that both workload and the 
performance measure increase together. In addition, we created scatter plots to visually 
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analyze the relationship between workload per filled billet and each of the individual 
performance measures. The results from Fort Eustis in 2007 were excluded from both the 
correlation determination and the scatter plots since the workload per filled billet of $45 
million was determined to be an outlier.  
As reflected in the table and charts, the correlations, although not very strong, 
indicate that as workload dollars per filled billet increase, contractor performance ratings 
also increase, and thus contract failure ratings decrease. Although the correlations are not 
particularly strong, they do provide some interesting preliminary findings that deserve further 
exploration. This relationship could be explained by reasoning that the MICC with higher 
workload (dollars per filled billets) may not have the resources to ensure due diligence in 
conducting thorough contractor performance assessments and thus may be inflating the 
performance ratings. Another explanation may be that MICCS with higher workloads may 
have more experienced and competent personnel and more capable contracting processes 
that are resulting in better contracts and successful contractors. As previously stated, 
although these correlations are not particularly strong, they do provide some interesting 
preliminary findings that deserve further exploration in future research. 
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Summary 
Although the service sector represents the largest and the fastest-growing segment 
of the U.S. economy and comprises over half of the DoD’s procurement dollars, poor 
management practices have undermined the government’s ability to obtain best value in 
services acquisition. The DoD must give greater attention to proper procurement planning, 
source selection, and contract administration in acquiring services. The use of contractor 
performance information is a critical facet of services acquisition. During the source 
selection phase of the contract management process, specifically proposal evaluation, the 
DoD relies on the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) to obtain an 
offeror’s past performance information, a required evaluation factor in source selections. 
Additionally, during the contract closeout phase, specifically after the contract period of 
performance, the DoD assesses the contractor’s performance and reports this assessment 
in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). 
The objective of this research was to identify variables in the services contracting 
process that drive the success of services acquisition. Our research approach included 
analyzing contractor past performance data obtained from the DoD PPIRS database. We 
accessed the PPIRS database to collect contractor performance ratings on completed 
services contracts to determine whether the contracts are successful or not successful. 
Using statistical analysis to draw conclusions on whether certain contracting variables, type 
of service, contract dollar value, level of competition, and contract type affected the success 
of the contract, we generalized our research findings and provided recommendations for 
improving the Army’s as well as the DoD’s services acquisition management. Our focus is to 
identify where the contract failures could be addressed, thus assisting DoD contracting 
officials. In presenting the conclusion of our research, we have to first assume that the 
awarded contract was proper (based on a fair and reasonable price and accurately reflecting 
schedule and performance requirements) in terms of the requiring agency’s needs. With a 
properly awarded contract, the DoD can then perform the required contract administration 
activities in order to identify deficiencies with the contractor’s work and ensure proper 
documentation into CPARS. 
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Conclusion 
The following presents our research questions and related findings: 
1. Do the types of services being acquired affect the success of a service 
contract? 
The S type services (Utilities and Housekeeping) had the highest failure rate 
of all the product service codes analyzed. The S type services had 11 
contract failures, resulting in a 3.77% failure rate. The reasons for contract 
failure included business relations and management of key personnel.  
2. Do the contractual amounts affect the success of a service contract? 
Contracts with a dollar value from $50 million to $1 billion had the highest 
failure rate of all the contract categories. The contracts with dollar values 
between $50 million to $1 billion category consisted of 92 contracts, with 
eight labeled failures giving it a failure rate of 8.7%. This group’s most 
common reason for failing was cost control.  
3. Does the level of competition used affect the success of a service contract? 
Contracts awarded competitively had the highest failure rate when compared 
to the other two forms of competition available. Of the 540 competitive 
contracts, 17 were labeled as failures, which yield a failure rate of 3.15%. The 
reasons that most often resulted in a contract failure were in the areas of 
schedule and cost control. 
4. Does the contract type affect the success of a services contract? 
Contracts structured as a combination contract had the highest failure rate 
when compared to the other five types of available contracts. There were four 
combination contracts examined in the database. Of these four contracts, two 
were labeled failures, which yields a failure rate of 50.0%. Schedule and cost 
were both referenced twice in the failed contracts, while quality and 
management of key personnel were each referenced once.  
We further analyzed our data to determine whether any of the variables had a 
significant relationship with contract success by specifically looking at the contract failure 
rates. We used the chi-square test (Fisher’s exact test) to test if the actual failure rates are 
significantly different than what would be expected if the total contract failure rate was 
applied to each variable. The results of the chi-square test identified that Contractual 
Amounts and Contract Type were our only statistically significant variables. 
Finally, we looked at the relationships between percentage of filled 1102 billets and 
failure rates, and between workload dollars per filled billet and failure rates, and made some 
interesting observations. We saw that as the percentage of 1102 filled billets increased, the 
contract failure rate decreased. This would seem intuitive: that as the workforce increases, 
the contract success rate would also increase, since there would be sufficient resources to 
manage the contracting process. However, we also observed that as workload dollars per 
filled billet increased, contractor performance ratings also increased, and thus contract 
failure ratings decreased. This relationship appears counterintuitive, since any additional 
workload in the organization would place a higher demand on the workforce, thus resulting 
in fewer resources to manage the contracting process. These two observations need further 
exploration using a much expanded contractor performance database. 
Recommendations 
The overarching goal in our services acquisition research stream is to identify the 
drivers of acquisition practices and their relationship to successful service contracts, or, in 
other words, “What drives successful services contracts?” Our previous research indicated 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = - 515 - 
that the DoD defines and measures a successful services contract by analyzing the contract 
outcomes (performance, cost, and schedule). We used contractor performance as a 
surrogate measure for contract outcomes; that is, a successful contractor as reflected in the 
CPAR (in terms of quality, schedule, cost control, business relations, management of key 
personnel, and utilization of small business) would indicate a successful contract. Thus, our 
research used contractor performance ratings to determine if there was any relationship 
between contract variables and contract success. Based on our research, we provide the 
following recommendations for our more meaningful research findings.  
Finding 1 stated that the S type services (Utilities and Housekeeping) had the 
highest failure rate of all of the product service codes analyzed. Although this finding was 
not statistically significant, it may indicate that contracting for utilities and housekeeping 
services may be more difficult than for the other service types. Perhaps the contracting 
agencies may need to place additional emphasis on procurement planning (developing the 
utilities and housekeeping services performance work statement [PWS]) as well as source 
selection (evaluation of offeror technical proposals). Additionally, increased emphasis during 
contract administration (contractor oversight and surveillance) may also improve the 
success of utilities and housekeeping services contracts. 
Finding 2 shows that contracts with a dollar value from $50 million to $1 billion had 
the highest failure rate of all contract dollar value categories. The most common reason for 
these contract failures was due to cost control factors. This finding was found to be 
statistically significant and provides an indication that perhaps contracts in this dollar value 
range require additional management review and oversight during the procurement planning 
and source selection phases. The contracting agencies may not be providing adequate 
review for these higher value contracts in the areas of developing PWSs, cost estimates, 
budgets, and service delivery schedules.  
Finding 3 identified that contracts awarded competitively had the highest failure rate 
when compared to contracts awarded non-competitively. The most common reason for 
these contracts failures was due to schedule and cost control factors. Although this finding 
was not statistically significant, it may indicate that additional emphasis may be needed in 
conducting competitive source selections. Perhaps the contracting agencies may need 
additional training in offeror proposal evaluation, specifically evaluating cost and technical 
proposals, as well as evaluating project schedules. The offeror’s cost and technical 
proposals and schedule reflects the offeror’s understanding of the contract requirements. If 
these proposals and schedules are not properly evaluated by trained source selection team 
members, the contractor may experience cost overruns and schedule delays.  
Finding 4 identified that contracts structured as combination contracts had the 
highest failure rate when compared to the other five types of available contracts (CPAF, 
CPIF, CPFF, FFP, Other). This finding was found to be statistically significant and provides 
an indication that perhaps services contracts consisting of a combination of contract types 
are more complex and require additional management review and oversight during the 
contracting process. The contracting agencies may not be providing adequate review of 
these more complex contracts in the areas of developing PWSs, cost estimates, budgets, 
and service delivery schedules. In addition, the contracting agencies may need to provide 
additional training to the contracting workforce, specifically in the areas of dealing with 
combined cost type and fixed price services contracts. 
Our final recommendation is based on Finding 8, which showed that as the 
percentage of 1102 filled billets increased, the contract failure rate decreased. Although this 
was not found to be statistically significant, it does show that as the agencies’ contracting 
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workforce increased, the contract success rate increased as well. Thus, our 
recommendation is that the contracting agencies strive to ensure that there are sufficient 
1102 billets for each organization and that these billets are sufficiently filled with trained 
contracting professionals.  
Our analysis of CPAR data identified some interesting areas worthy of further 
exploration. First, we would like to analyze an expanded database of services contracts, to 
include other services in addition to the four service types we initially researched. With the 
expanded database, we can analyze overall contract failure rates, as well as contract failure 
rates for our selected contract variables (type of service, dollar value, competition level, and 
contract type). Second, we would like to further explore the relationships between 
percentage of filled 1102 billets and contract failure rates, and between workload dollars per 
filled billet and contract failure rates. Expanding our contractor performance database to 
include other service types will provide the data integrity needed to identify any stronger 
relationships among these contract variables. Finally, we would like to analyze the narrative 
portion of the contractor performance reports to determine alignment with the objective 
performance ratings, as well as the value added, not only in the narrative portions, but also 
in the usefulness of the CPARS as a contractor assessment tool. 
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